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Now a century old, Frank Baum's The Wonderful
Wizard of Oz continues to captivate children of ail
ages. But, perhaps no audience is more enamored
of the tale than economists, who believe the story
describes the economic and political wars fought
between western agricultural interests and eastern
money interests at the end of tt^ nineteenth
century. In parttcular, some economists believe
that Frank Baum, a resident of Aberdeen, SO, used
the Yellow Brick Road (The Gold Standard) as an
allusion to a strong dollar policy, complete with high
interest rates and tow inflation.^ While this policy
was popular in Oz (Washington D.C.), it did not
serve American agricultural and manufacturing
interests (Scarecrow and the Tin Man, respectively)
because falling prices lowered revenues while the
costs of production remained relatively constant.
Today, America^ strong demand for Imports has
once again tilted policy Infavor of a relatively strong
dollar, since a significant fall in the value of the
dollar could ignite inflation as imports become more
expensive. But. although a strong dollar policy has
helped propel the US economy into its 9^ yearof
economic expansion, the benefits to the Upper
Mirtwest have been tenuous at fcjest.^
A Pfimer on International Trade
The international sector of an economy is
comprised of two parts: foreign purchases of goods
' Preser(i8d at the 1S9S South Dakota Bankers Assoctation Meetings,
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and sen/ices produced domestically (exports) and
domestic purchases of goods and services
produced abroad (imports). Exports are
'expansionary' since as exports rise, domestic
inventories diminish and/or domestic production
increases; likewise. Imports are 'contractionary'
because as imports rise, domestic inventories
accumulate and/or domestic production falls. A
balance of trade surplus arises when net exports
(the difference between exports and imports) are
positive; while a balance of trade deficit occurs
when net exports are negative.
Does International Trade Matter?
That the net effect of international transactions in
goods and services matters little to aggregate
spending in the US seems plausible since the trade
deficit currently measures only 4.3% of real GDP,
or$24 billion.'' But the trade ^ficit shrouds the
extent to which the US economy is dependent upon
the global marketplace. In particular, US exports
comprised 13% of total spending on goods and
services produced in the US in the second quarter
of 1999, while total trade (exports plus imports)
grew to 30% of GDP. Hence, at least one very
salient fact about the US economy is concealed in
the data on net exports; one eighth of the demand
for US output is foreign.
Nonetheless, recent attention to the trade deficit
has focused on another matter entirely. Namely, as
imports continue to outpace exports, foreigners
receive more dollars than Americans receive of
foreign currencies. This means that the share of
dollar-denominated securities in foreign portfolios is
rising, as is the likelihood that foreign portfolio
managers will unload their excess doiiar holdings,
if such a sell-off were to occur, the dollar would
weaken significantly, import prices would rise, and
the current US expansion would stow. The concern
that a rise In the price of imports could lead to a
jump in inflation has placed policy makers firmiy
upon the Yellow Brick Road. That is, the doiiar is
relatively strong (figure 1), interest rates are rising
^us Dept. ofCommerce, Bureeu ofEconomic Analysis.
to keep doiiar-denorrtinatec! investments attractive,
and price ieveigrowth is trivia!.^
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The US OoKar: An Upper Mid-Weet Perspective
The international value of the US dollar matters to
US agricultufa! interests in one respect: exports. In
general, a strong dollar increases the foreign price
of US exports, making tt^ US relatively less
competitive in the international mafketplace .
Meanwhile, a weak dollar lowers the international
price of US exports, thereby increasing US
competitiveness abroad. Figure 2 illustrates this
point with a plot of US exports before and after the
Asian crisis, whicrfi began in July of 1997 with a
devaluation of the Thai 8aht,
f-'tgyf* 2 of 1«K>. i, SX. i?i«rterty <tm
SMjre# us DepiofCi!fmn«fe«. <X ixsotKi^ie AfWysM#
m
m
m
^ 130
it
Ii .110
100
90
'•m m4 10S6 ises
As the Asian crisis matured, international investors
rushed to buy dollar-denominated assets, causing a
rise in the dollar and a fall in US exports. Now that
l30th the dollar and import demand are relatively
strong, US policymakers find themselves
maintaining the strong doilar for fear of a rise in
import prices. The implication for US agriculture is
A !r3d«-weigh<ed sxcharvge rate equai® th« weighteil average of tfia
US' major tradifig partners' awjhange rates, where weighfs are
determmed by traoe voiyme. For more ors trade-weightirss see Leahy,
Micttae! (199S).
clear: to the extent that foreigners purchase US
aghcuiturai output, a strong dollar hampers the
competitiveness of the Upper Mid-West economy in
the international marketpiacs,
8ut do exports matter to US agriculture? Of the top
100 commodities exported from the US in 1998
/t>eans, com and
respectiveiy.
while their total doilar voiume combined ranked 6th
(aircraft and automobiles ranked 1 and 2,
respectively).^ Dollar volumes were $4,9 billion for
soybeans, $4.4 billion for corn and $3.5 billion for
wheat. Moreover, during the 1998/1999 growing
season, foreign demand for US agricultural exports
accounted for 21% and 42% of course grain and
wheat production, respectively /
The Competition
While the US is the dominant player in the three
commodity types described above, foreign
competition is present in eac^ market. In particular,
four other major producers compete in com {market
share in parentheses); Argentina (12%), China
(5%), Hungary (3%) and S. Afhca (1%), four others
compete in wheat: Australia (17%), EU (17%).
Canada (16%) and Argentina (9%), and four others
in Soybeans: Brazil (22%), Argentina (6%),
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Paraguay (4%) and the EU (3%).® Figure 3
illustrates how some of these competitor's
currencies have fared against the doilar since 1997.
The "Emerging" series is a trade-weighted average
of smaller, developing economies, including
Argentina, Brazil, China and Paraguay. With the
exception of the Euro and Argentina's Peso (shown
* US Dept. erf the Census.
' USDAForeign A.Qr(cuiturai Service.
here as a component of the Emerging series), all of
the US' competitors in the production of com,
wheat and soytjeans have currencies that are
significantly undervalued against the US dollar.®
Hence, US commodities are relatively more
expensive than those produced in these other
nations.
A Strong Dollar is Particularly Hard on
Agriculture
While a strong dollar decreases the demand for US
exports overall, as foreigners purchase goods and
services produced by other exporting nations,
agricultural bulk commodities are hit particularly
hard because they are largely homogenous (or
identical in most respects). While this may seem
like an innocuous quality, the implication for export
demand is sobering. Unlike other US exports,
perfect substitutes exist for US agricultural output;
that is, soybeans produced in Brazil are more or
less identical to those produced in the northem
plains of the US. Therefore, the demand for US
exports is extremely price-sensitive. Table 1
illustrates this point with a comparison of export
growth rates between 1995 and 1998 for com,
wheat, soybeans (SBs) and all US exports
(agricultural and nonagricultural combined).
Table 1: Annual Growth in US Exports, 1995-1998,
Agricultural v. All Exports, annual averages of
quarterly data
Com Wheat SBs All
1995 2.3% 4.5% 1.6% 14.7%
1996 -19.4% -19.3% 3.6% 6.3%
1997 -16.2% 3.9% -1.4% 11.1%
1998 13.0% 5.8% -4.6% -1.3%^.6
Source; USDA
While growth in total US exports did not exhibit the
effect of a strong dollar until 1998, slow or negative
growth in US agricultural exports began in 1995 for
com, wheat and soybeans. This was due, in part,
to the homogeneous nature of these commodities,
which allowed competitors to increase market
share at the expense of the US.
Policy Prescription
The view taken here is that the relatively strong
value of the US dollar, as measured against other
agricultural producing nations' currencies, has
hampered US competitiveness in the global
marketplace. Nonetheless, a weak dollar policy
*Currently, the Euro and thePesoareovervalued and pegged tothe
US dollar, respectively.
could be a detriment to US growth at this time.
Namely, given the US' cument import demand
(roughly 17% of GDP) a weak dollar could lead to
inflation and slow the current US expansion.
Second, much of the strength in the dollar is the
result of a flight to quality' by the intemational
community. That is, investors are, for the time
being, not desirous of the investments (direct or
financial) in the world's emerging economies,
hence they have chosen to abandon these
currencies in favor of the dollar. Therefore, a long-
run solution will require the legal and financial
frameworks of these emerging economies to be
rehabilitated such that foreign investment will once
again flow into their currencies. Indeed, some of
these changes have occurred, as evidenced by the
rebound in com and wheat exports since the Asian
crisis began in June of 1997.
Conclusion
This article offers a partial explanation for the recent
weak export demand for US agricultural production.^®
Namely, that America's strong demand for imports has
tilted US policy in favor of a relatively strong dollar, since
a depreciation of the dollar could ignite inflation. As a
result, the Upper Midwest's competitiveness in the global
marketplace has been compromised. Nonetheless, that
a weak dollar policy can benefit the economy at this time
is not likely. Instead, a long-run solution will require a
restructuring of the legal and financial frameworks of
emerging market economies so that foreign investment
will once again flow into their currencies.
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No doubt, other factors have contributed to weak export demand as
well. Including foreign production expansion (i.e.. Brazil) and self-
sufficiefx:y programs (I.e., China).
Commodity Marketing/Pnce Risk Management
Wofltshops for South Dakota Farmers
and Ranchers
November 1099
Watertown. Sisseton. Union Center
December
Suffaio, Belle Fourche, Brookings,
Gettysburg
January 2000
Highmore, Fiandreau, Redfieid, Huron
February 2000
Miller, Aberdeen, Corsica, Beresford,
Gregory, Presho, Pukwana, Lennox,
Yankton
March 2000
Lennox, Sioux Falls, Veblen, Webster
Contact your local County Extension Office for
speciffc details of the merkating/piice risk
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Watch "Midwest MarketAnalysis" on SD Public
Television Friday nights at9:30 p.m. CT (8:30 Ml)
or Saturdays at 12:30 p.m. CT(11:30 MT). This is
the 20** year ofproduction for Midwest Market
Analysis. This television program is produced by
the Economics Department at South Dakota State
University, in cooperation with the SDSU
Cooperative Extension Service and tee SDSU
Cotege ofAgriculture and Btetogical Sciences,
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